devices containing so much of their personal, sensitive information.
In this article, I explore these ownership issues-their origins; their security, privacy, and autonomy implications for users; and their economic and ecological implications. In particular, I argue that the current smartphone and tablet ownership model violates users' reasonable expectations and fundamental rights without giving them sufficient recompense. Although users buy and therefore supposedly own the devices, the manufacturers or software system integrators, retailers, and network connection providers retain considerable control, prohibiting users from both protecting their privacy and making use of the device's full capabilities. I also argue that the claim that such external control improves users' security is false in multiple ways.
Ownership
Ownership is not as simple a concept as it might first appear. There are legal concepts of ownership that confer both rights and responsibilities to the owners. There are psychological elements such that individuals might feel that their rights-or even their person-have been violated when their legal rights or technical control over their possessions don't match their expectations. There are economic issues driving the market that restrict device owners' actions. In the end, what we think of as ownership is simply shorthand for a bundle of rights in an object. Ownership rights usually include the right to decide who can use an object, and something owned can usually be sold to another.
However in most countries, we can't sell our body organs, even those without which we could survive (such as one kidney or part of a liver)-despite most people considering themselves owners of their own bodies. 5 Such restrictions are often justified by appeal to a general social benefit, such as avoiding exploitation of the poor as a resource for body parts by the rich. In the case of smartphones and tablets, however, these ownership restrictions seem far from justified when we consider the privacy and security costs to users.
Psychological Attachment to Personal Devices
Smartphones are both phones and computers. Therefore, to understand user expectations of ownership, we must consider the background of ownership rights for both. I focus on the PC era for computers and (mostly) the mobile phone era for telephones. PCs allowed people to have computers not only in their homes but also in their individual office spaces; despite these office PCs being owned by the organization, many people described and felt them to be personal devices. As Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass note, people's emotional and psychological attachments to devices are often quite illogical, such as distinguishing between completely fungible devices (identical specification, all data stored on a network) based simply on prior usage of a particular machine. 6 In many countries, early fixedline phone networks only allowed devices supplied by the network operator to connect to the network. They claimed that this was to prevent damage to the network, although as the US Carterfone case demonstrated, this was at least partly a spurious claim; in fact, the preservation of sales or rental income on monopoly-provided equipment was the primary reason. 7, 8 Presmartphone mobile phones in the developed world quickly became objects of deep emotional attachment for their owners. 9 Given the intense and intimate usage of modern mobile devices, it's unsurprising that users develop strong positive feelings, including trust, toward their devices. However, this trust is misplaced because they actually give up a great deal of control to the real "owners" of the devices: the providers (primarily manufacturers and mobile phone operating companies).
Technical Ownership (Control) of Mobile Phones
Early digital mobile phones had very limited capabilities beyond making phone calls and sending and receiving short text messages. As their capabilities expanded to include digital cameras and connections to networked information services, the hardware and operating systems became more complicated, and interoperability issues between networks and phones and between phones and other devices (particularly PCs) arose. Early feature phones containing information services ran various OSs with different openness levels.
Most early feature phones included limited or no ability to update the system software. In particular, over-the-air (OTA) updates to the phone's firmware (that is, downloading an updated core OS via the mobile network) weren't generally supported. Many phones ran highly customized OSs, and few systems were used by more than one manufacturer.
Firmware-installed OS upgrades, if possible at all, were generally restricted to specialpurpose hardware at service centers. Some later phones allowed users to update by downloading new firmware to a PC over the Internet: they had to connect the phone to the PC and run an update program on the PC to rewrite the phone's software. (This was also the update process for iPhones until iOS 5, which introduced OTA updates.)
The road from digital mobile handset to smartphone had many dead ends, byways, and failed highway projects. The smartphone basically combines a digital mobile phone handset and a PDA. The degree of openness of many early smartphones reflected the creators' route-whether they started with a phone and tried to give it PDA functionality and Internet access, or started with a PDA and tried to give it phone functionality and Internet access. For example, Nokia and Microsoft started from the PDA concept, with Nokia creating environments such as the S60 platform and the Symbian system (which superseded S60 at Nokia and was based on the EPOC OS from the UK's Psion PDA maker). Microsoft developed the Windows CE and Windows Mobile systems, both of which had open application development layers and allowed user installation of applications.
In Japan, NTT, the former state fixed-line phone monopoly provider, developed Mobile-Oriented Applications Platform (MOAP) systems-one based on a Symbian kernel and the other on a Linux
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kernel-which had neither open third-party development options nor user-installable applications. These systems used NTT's proprietary i-mode system to provide Internet-like services, including translating suitable webpages into a form viewable on the grayscale phone screen and using the keypad for interaction. As with computer gaming consoles, MOAP systems had application development platforms. To access them, development companies were required to enter into contracts with NTT. Application development for these systems was typically done by or under contract to the hardware manufacturer, who sought to compete in the market by offering built-in applications. Japanese rivals au by KDDI and SoftBank Mobile developed phones supporting the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) standard that allowed access to websites through a stylesheet-like approach. Interactive applications running locally on the device, however, could be produced only using proprietary software development kits. For example, email on these Japanese phones was available only through dedicated apps using the service provider's mail server, or through a WAP-enabled webmail service.
Systems with open applicationdevelopment environments such as PalmOS, its successor WebOS, Symbian, BlackBerry OS, iOS, and Android have gradually taken much of the market share for mobile devices, including not just smartphones but also larger tablets. Again, devices running these systems are really general-purpose computing devices with mobile networking and integration with POTS (plain old telephone service) via a "phone" app. They're designed to be devices with which software is used, rather than on which software is developed. Although programs can be developed in some applications (such as TerminalIDE for Android), these devices aren't intended as platforms on which to develop apps to run on them. Most development happens on other, more powerful computers running suitable development tools.
There have been and remain many levels of openness in these systems with regard to user control. iOS devices generally only allow applications to be installed from the Apple App Store. Android vendors can preset application sources to be allowed or disallowed. Some distributed versions allow users to switch on other sources, whereas other distributed versions limit application sources to those they have preset. RIM's BlackBerry OS before version 10 (which was a complete rewrite based on the QNX kernel) restricted application installation to only RIM's repository. The BlackBerry 10 system, however, supports Android applications including the ability to install applications from alternative sources like the Amazon Appstore for Android. Only apps from the Windows App store can be installed on Window Phone devices.
Anyone with physical access to a device can, with enough effort, control that device. Physical access restrictions are a standard part of security engineering. 10 However, most people don't have the expertise or equipment to work around devices' built-in control restrictions. Sometimes there are legal restrictions on doing so that make it illegal 11 or more difficult to obtain the required hardware, 12 or that place the user in breach of contract. 13 Although manufacturers such as Sony and Asus provide instructions and options for users to access full administrative rights (root user or superuser) on some Android-based devices, they do so only with the mobile network provider's agreement, which is often withheld. Many manufacturers and mobile network operators preload Android devices with bloatware-(often unwanted) apps that aren't deletable on a nonrooted phone. Many of these apps are set to start on boot, requiring users to manually turn them off after every reboot-the option to not run on boot is usually locked in the user settings.
Interestingly 14 Regulators such as the US Federal Communications Commission are reluctant to require manufacturers and network operators to grant users full control over their own devices. They're concerned that users might misuse software-defined radio capabilities to interfere with other mobile phones and radio communications. However, neither the US Copyright Office's exemption of iPhone jailbreaking and Android rooting 11 from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA's) anticircumvention rules nor the prevalence of these practices by users have persuaded telecom regulators to insist that users be given real ownership of and control over their devices.
Security and Privacy on Possessed Devices
Smartphones and tablets are primarily used for communication (social networking services, photo sharing, messaging, and voice and video calls), although media consumption (games, videos, audio, and text) and information processing (note-taking and self-quantification) are also significant uses. The locked-down model of previous generations' media consumption devices-whereby the manufacturer or other upstream retailer significantly controls the device-seems a poor deal for consumers. Bruce Schneier called this www.computer.org/security the "feudal security" model (http:// tinyurl.com/b7s2fq4; http://tinyurl .com/k8x5de4). As in the feudal social model, the overlords aren't trustworthy, and the moral hazards of their position without strong external regulation lead them to abusive practices such as secretly spying on users' locations (see for example, Google and Apple 15, 16 ). Meanwhile, device manufacturers are constantly tweaking proprietary device drivers for their Android phones, 17 shipping binary blobs for attachment to Android's Free Software Linux kernel, all with too little appreciation of the security risks of these often hastily programmed hardware interfaces.
Direct Security Risks of Rooting and Jailbreaking
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Lange discuss the risks users run if they root their Android devices, 18 and Kevin Rogers provides a similar discussion of the dangers of jailbreaking iOS devices. 19 Because neither Android nor iOS is designed to run administration accounts, despite both being based on Unixrelated kernels (Linux and XNU [X is Not Unix], respectively), once the systems are hacked to expose these administrator-level accounts, they're more vulnerable to external hacking. Although users' privacy and, to some extent, security are always at risk from any application they install (and from other vectors), once they've rooted or jailbroken their device, the applications they install can request root access, which many users will likely grant-just as they grant privacy-invasive privileges to apps such as those to use the camera flash like a flashlight. 20 
Indirect Security Risks of Rooting and Jailbreaking
The hoarding of vulnerabilities by the US National Security Agency and UK Government Communications Headquarters (and probably many other signals intelligence agencies) is condemned by security professionals as putting everyone's security at risk by decreasing the chances that project management becomes aware of vulnerabilities and takes steps to fix them. 21 Similarly, because jailbreaking an iOS device or rooting many Android devices requires breaking their security model, users (particularly highly skilled white hat hackers) have an incentive to prevent system developers from knowing about the vulnerabilities they exploit. These vulnerabilities, in addition to being used by users to gain control over their devices, can also be used by attackers to elevate their privileges as part of a malicious attack.
In addition, preventing users from controlling their own devices encourages them to try to follow instructions on bypassing their devices' security from dubious sources. Although most online directions about jailbreaking and rooting devices are what they appear, most users don't have the technical expertise to know whether the directions will actually help them achieve their goals or, instead (or in addition), install malware or open up a security hole in their device. Such attacks often target Facebook users; Facebook calls this the self-cross-site-scripting attack (www .facebook.com/notes/facebook -sec ur it y/dont-be-a-sel f -x ss -victim/10152054702905766). Users' willingness to follow somewhat random online advice on breaking their devices' security shouldn't be encouraged, any more than car owners should be encouraged to install updates to their cars' onboard systems using a USB stick delivered to their address without verifying its source as the manufacturer. 22 
Security Risks of Not Rooting and Jailbreaking
Without administrative control of a device, checking the integrity of system files and monitoring the presence and activity of installed applications are very difficult. On both iOS and Android, in fact, ordinary userspace applications aren't supposed to monitor or interfere with other apps. Google and Apple enforce such policies in their respective app stores, although for most Android devices, you can install apps from other sources. Even when such monitoring can be installed as a user-space app, its access to other software's activities is limited.
Lack of administrative control becomes increasingly problematic as smartphone providers (manufacturers, system integrators, telcos, and so on) apparently want users to upgrade their devices more often than some might want to. With the rapid development of iOS, Android, and new models, system providers (typically manufacturers) aren't providing older devices with updates. Even if manufacturers support these older devices, updates are being rolled out far too infrequently. Daniel Thomas and his colleagues recently showed that even though Google is patching the base Android system, many manufacturers are very slow to feed such patches through to users' devices: 87 percent of the Android machines in their study had known unpatched vulnerabilities. 23 Once updates for the core iOS or Android system stop appearing, Preventing users from controlling their own devices encourages them to try to follow instructions on bypassing their devices' security from dubious sources.
devices often can't run updated versions of various apps, leaving them vulnerable to security problems in the apps' older versions as well as in the OS itself. A very serious version of this problem appeared in January 2015, when Google announced it wouldn't be providing a security fix for a known vulnerability in the WebKit Web browser app, a key element of Android 4.1 to 4.3. 24 (Google did say it would accept and push a patch if offered by a reliable third party). Although it's possible to use alternative browsers such as Mozilla's Firefox, which is updated and available even on the older Android versions, many apps use the WebKit rendering engine for their own HTML parsing and presentation. As I noted, users find it difficult or impossible to know which apps interoperate with which other elements of the system, particularly core elements such as the Web rendering engine.
Unlike, for example, PCs running Windows XP-which Microsoft supported with security patches for more than a decade-Android 4.3.1 was only released in October 2013. Users are completely at the hardware manufacturer's mercy to compile and release a new version of Android for their hardware. So, the manufacturer likely hasn't updated phones released in mid-2013 beyond 4.3.1, which less than 18 months after release, had security vulnerabilities in a core service app that Google decided not to patch and which, even if patched by Google, would probably not be offered as a downstream update by other manufacturers.
Without administrative access, which smartphone providers are reluctant to grant, Android users can't even install an alternative compatible OS such as CyanogenMod. iOS device users face a similar situation, with their reasonably recent devices (sometimes less than two-years old) being left out of the OS upgrade cycle; thus, they're forced to upgrade their hardware or remain vulnerable. Even for a jailbroken iPhone, there appears to be no alternative OS that can be installed to compensate for the lack of an Apple-provided, securityupdated iOS.
Privacy Risks of Not Rooting and Jailbreaking
Security and privacy are often represented as oppositional duals: one must give up some privacy to gain some security. Although this might be true in some circumstances, the security of the devices we use is a prerequisite for privacy, not in opposition to it. Being able to see whether unauthorized software is running requires administrator access, as does monitoring and controlling apps' provision of private information. Android applications such as Android Privacy Guard require root access to provide such facilities to users.
So, Who Owns My Device?
So, ownership isn't a single absolute concept granting all possible rights to an item. However, smartphones-whose hardware, such as microphones, cameras, accelerometers, and GPS, and software and data, such as contact listings, photos, social network posts, email, communications, and media consumption, make them so useful but also so risky in terms of privacy and security-aren't primarily owned by their users. Instead, the phone company, hardware manufacturer, and system integrator are these devices' practical owners.
This lack of ownership requires, at the very least, significantly improved consumer rights and privacy protections. As Thomas and his colleagues showed, Android smartphone manufacturers are leaving their users' software vulnerable by not providing regular updates. 23 In the PC world, patching has become one of the standard backbones of ensuring security. System administrators who don't patch their systems are regarded as unprofessional at best, and criminally negligent at worst. Home users are exhorted to keep their systems up to date; in fact, in an effort to preserve the ecosystem's security, Windows 10 Home Edition no longer allows users to defer security updates.
However, there is a long history of software being provided "without warranty. " Consumer goods such as cars and drinks used to be outside such negligence claims in most circumstances, but seminal court cases in the early 20th century established a duty of care for manufacturers to not sell dangerous goods into the supply chain, such as cars with faulty brakes (US: MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.) 25 or drinks contaminated with slugs (Scotland: Donoghue v. Stevenson). 26 The implications of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. are likely to gain importance as cars become further informatized and, even without being driverless, increasingly vulnerable to external hacking. 27 Although not usually as physically dangerous, smartphones and tablets are so embedded in our lives that their information is vital to our personal infrastructure, and manufacturers', telcos', and retailers' lack of liability is hard to defend.
Limitations should be clearly justified as in the public interest, not simply in the providers' commercial interest.
www.computer.org/security At best, the US Copyright Office's exemption of iOS jailbreaking and Android rooting from illegalization under the DMCA 19 should be extended in the US and adopted elsewhere as a clear right of device owners to opt out of external controls by others (whether a person or an organization) on any device; hardware owners should have full visibility of their device's operation and a much greater level of control-that is to say, proper ownership of the device.
Remaining limitations should be clearly justified as in the public interest, not simply in the providers' commercial interest (such as reducing costs by not issuing security updates, charging users for permission to use devices' innate capabilities, or profiting from the invasion of users' privacy). If support for security updates on a device is no longer offered, then restrictions on user access to full control of the device aren't justified. Perhaps at this point, legal liability for failures might shift from providers to users, much as it already does with PCs. Those still running Windows XP have only themselves to blame if their devices invade their privacy or are used as zombies in a botnet. U nfortunately, events don't appear to be traveling in this direction. In 2012, the US Copyright Office demurred from extending their "right to jailbreak" from iPhones and Android phones to iPads and Android tablets. 28 The latest leaks about the controversial and secretly negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership include requirements to further lock down devices and to impose harsh penalties-including destruction of the machine-on anyone found circumventing technical protection measures. If this agreement is adopted, in places like the US, Australia, and Japan, a rooted Android or jailbroken iOS device that could bypass digital rights management on music, books, or video files would be subject to confiscation and destruction. 29 A.A. Adams is a professor of information ethics at Meiji University. Contact him at aaa@meiji.ac.jp. 
